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Who's Afraid of the Welfare State? 
Contemporary Debates about the State of 
Flexible Work I Flexible Welfare 
BETIINA CASS* 
Welfare States: Flexibility and Dependency 
Fear of the welfare state is evident and growing virtually into the 
dimensions of 'moral panic' in contemporary Australia and in 
Anglo-American countries with similar welfare regimes and 
welfare traditions. This moral panic is generated primarily at 
political/official level, but also enjoys a considerable following at 
community level, as a result of the mobilisation of mistrust of 
welfare state policies and, more particularly, the identification of 
a so called 'culture of entitlement to benefits', a culture of 'welfare 
dependency' bastioned by publicly provided goods such as health 
care and education. There are strong indications that the 
fundamental legitimacy and cultural acceptance of the tenets of 
Australia's post-war welfare state are being subjected to processes 
of concerted de-legitimation. 
The most visible, accessible and public manifestation of 
these processes is the official naming of the state of welfare 
dependency or, more accurately, any form of 'public dependency' , 
as the anathema of independent man operating individually, 
autonomously and flexibly in the labour markets of late twentieth 
century and fin de siecie flexible capitalism.' The concept of 
'dependency' has been a key-word of the politics of welfare 
discourse and practice for more than forty years, but has gained 
particular ascendancy in periods of high unemployment since 
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the mid-1970s and, in particular, in the last decade as forms of 
employment have been increasingly transformed into the flexible 
arrangements, the core/periphery models of international ising 
labour markets. The concept of dependency has gained greatest 
credence since the mid-1970s in the context of high levels of 
unemployment and long-term unemployment (compared with the 
first three decades of the post-war period), and even more recently 
with the increase in forms of casualised, precarious employment, 
compared with the social expectation of a secure working life-
span which was the key characteristic of adult male employment 
throughout the post-war boom. A recent OECD report notes that 
'a number of OECD countries face a growing gap between those 
who are well placed to profit from the new career opportunities 
being created by technology and globalisation and those who are 
not. The evidence suggests that there has been a structural shift in 
the labour market to the detriment of the less well educated and 
low skilled'.2 It is in this context that the official gaze turns to 
'dependency', which focusses attention on the social and individual 
consequences of economic and labour market transformations, 
'individualises' what is essentially a structural economic and 
political issue, and hence narrows substantially, and indeed shapes, 
the scope and content of policy debates. 
What are the historical bases of post-war welfare states? The 
development of various forms of welfare state provision in the 
western market economies during and immediately after World 
War II were predicated in many countries, in particular the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Western Europe and the Nordic countries, on 
what Anglophones think of as the Keynesian and Beveridgean 
principle of 'full employment'. Welfare state policies and practices 
were not first and foremost about welfare or social security: they 
were primarily concerned with the macro-economic and cross-
national regulatory controls and agreements which would generate 
and maintain full employment in the post-war world. Australia has 
its own significant history of the full employment/welfare state 
nexus: the 1945 White Paper, Full Employment in Australia,3 
attributable to the leadership of the Keynesian economist and 
Commonwealth Government bureaucrat H. C. Coombs, at that 
10 
time Secretary of the Department of Post-War Reconstruction, 
posited that the Australian economy could be lifted to, and 
maintained at, a full employment equilibrium if there were sufficient 
central government intervention, investment in economic and 
employment growth, and various forms of regulatory control, in 
particular of financial and labour market institutions.4 In his 
autobiography, Trial Balance, Coombs articulated his belief that 
Keynesian economic policy in war-time and in the post-war period 
was influenced by 'a philosophy based upon a faith in the power of 
government intervention to contribute positively to the sum of 
human welfare, to civilise the content and the distribution of the 
product of its efficiency'.5 The Australian post-war welfare state 
was seen by Prime Minister Chifley as a 'safety net' which would 
be required to support working men and their families only when 
the short-term calamity of fractional or seasonal unemployment 
befell them. The more structural system of benefits for women 
with dependent children (including widows and deserted and 
divorced wives), payments through the transfer and tax systems 
for families with children, pensions and benefits for the aged, the 
sick and people with disabilities-all conditions which were 
seen to preclude employment-was consolidated in 1942-47 as 
essential elements of what Titmuss would have called legitimate 
public dependency. This was socially and culturally accepted and 
expected in the 'new social order' after the tragic depredations 
of the Depression of the 1930s and the Second World War. For 
about 30 years following the end of the Second World War, 
various Commonwealth and State governments across the 
political spectrum utilised various forms of public investment in 
employment growth and regulatory controls, including high 
trade tariffs which protected the Australian manufacturing sector, 
policies which saw employment growth remain strong and 
unemployment rates remain low. The high tariff barrier of those 
decades is hardly a policy to be resurrected, given that its protective 
reach included inefficient industries and management practices. 
However, from the mid-1970s, Australia and most other OECD 
countries have been shaken by four bouts of declining economic 
growth accompanied by increased rates of unemployment, 
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particularly long-term unemployment, and by labour market 
deregulation, which has resulted in a considerably greater 
proportion of jobs which are casual, part-time and precarious, 
described as the transformation to flexibility in a global ising 
economy. In association, these economic transformations have 
been followed or accompanied by advancing or promised 
commodification of health, human services and basic amenities, 
compared with earlier post-war developments.6 Neo-liberal 
critiques and partial or fundamental dismantling of post-war 
systems of social protection emerged in the Anglophone countries, 
including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and 
New Zealand'? 
Social citizenship rights in Australia and similar countries in 
the post-World War II welfare states were based, and seen to be 
based, on the promise of combinations of secure and adequately 
remunerated employment and other forms of social protection 
through taxlbenefit systems. The loss of this historical basis of 
welfare in the political and community consciousness, indeed 
the ahistorical nature of contemporary debates, allows for the 
conceptualisation of working age people who rely on social 
security or who do not participate in paid employment (unless 
they are partnered with children) as being dependent and a 
drain on the resources generated by economically active citizens, 
whilst those who are employed are viewed as independent. 
This dichotomisation, this characterisation which is a 
particularly insidious version of the notion of 'social parasitism', 
is characteristic of late-twentieth-century neo-liberal thought, as 
it was of the 'less eligibility' principle underlying various 
nineteenth-century Poor Laws. Such rhetoric is of course a denial 
of mutuality and interdependence. The objective of welfare 
states was to create a system of recognised interdependencies, of 
social rights and responsibilities necessary to reduce market-driven 
inequalities and to safeguard human dignity and freedom. The 
debate about freedom and independence in neo-liberal welfare 
discourse and practice, on the other hand, constitutes the isolated, 
atomised individual as the centre of morality and value in welfare 
and civil society, in such a way that redistribution through the taxi 
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benefit system is de-legitimated, that regularised protection of the 
wages system is de-legitimated, that adequate public investment 
in education, employment and training programs and public health 
provision is de-legitimated and, in the process, the social integration 
of communities is placed in jeopardy. The most important issue to 
be noted is that the market and masculine-centred dichotomy of 
independence/dependence is presented as if 'the normal human 
condition is independence and dependence is deviant' , as Fraser 
and Gordon pointed out in 1994. This is clearly an asocial and 
amoral, as well as profoundly ahistorical, construction ofthe human 
condition as essentially non-social. 
The Globalisation Debate 
Debates about the new flexibility of labour markets and the 
new flexibility of welfare must be situated in the context of inter-
nationalisation. There is an increased acceptance of the view that 
the national impacts of the intemationalisation of financial and 
trade markets cannot be influenced, modified or controlled by 
national government policies in respect of labour market, 
wages and welfare policies, which are seen as increasingly shaped 
and constrained by the imperatives of maintaining international 
competitiveness. 
On the one hand, global interdependence in financial markets 
has given impetus in some liberal democracies to the market-
driven logic that the maintenance of international competitiveness 
is impeded by national government regulatory controls and social 
investment (as well analysed by Mishra).8 This logic asserts the 
powerlessness (or foolhardiness) of national governments to seek 
to intervene effectively in the generation of employment, the 
lowering of unemployment and the development of an incomes 
policy designed to reduce, rather than exacerbate, inequality. The 
contrary logic notes that intemationalisation promotes co-operation 
in the enforcement of human and social rights, and co-operation in 
providing education, research and development opportunities and-
in the dissemination of ideas, technologies, cultural, literary and 
artistic production-a flow of material, intellectual, social and 
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cultural benefits, which indicates that the globalisation of trade 
and financial markets may also be harnessed to more beneficial 
outcomes. Comparative research indicates that even in globalised 
economies, policy responses to the growth of unemployment and 
potential social exclusion in various countries are comprised of 
different combinations of employment, education, training and 
social protection policies, producing either positive or negative 
impacts on job growth, reduction of unemployment and the 
mitigation of inequality.9 In one of the most important areas-
the increase in income inequality over the last two decades in a 
number of countries of the OECD area, consequent on economic 
transformations, labour market and wage deregulations, and the 
generation of unemployment-the increase in inequality has not 
been uniform across these countries. The extent of the increase 
in inequality is a consequence not only of a country's relative 
immersion in the global economy but, more pertinently, of its own 
domestic public policies, its own assemblage of social protection 
measures designed to mitigate unemployment, to reduce unequal 
access to adequately rewarded jobs, to increase access to education 
and training and to mitigate social exclusion. 10 In other words, 
governments can, and do, make a difference and are not the helpless 
victims of international forces-indeed, to claim that they are is to 
subsume them within the penumbra of 'dependency', to deny their 
capacity to act autonomously with a view to the development of 
autochthonous policy. 
What are the key millennial debates framing welfare state 
anxiety in Australia as it moves into the twenty-first century? 
• Justifications of, and policies to counteract, the acceptance 
since 1975 of high levels of unemployment, in particular, 
long-term unemployment, and the growing incidence of 
precarious, casualised employment, perceived as an inevitable 
consequence of labour market deregulation and international 
trade competition. These are debates about the future of 
employment and its remuneration. 
• The increase in income inequality and levels of poverty over 
the last two decades. These are predominantly attributable 
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in Australia, as in other OECD countries, to the increase in 
inequality of market incomes (derived from earnings, capital 
income, and self-employment income), and an increased 
dispersion of incomes, mitigated to some extent, but not 
sufficiently, by redistributive social policies. These are debates 
about the future of incomes policy in an internationalised 
financial system where it is widely held that a lower wage 
regime, accompanied by less generous, highly targeted and 
much more harshly scrutinised welfare arrangements (enforcing 
the unequal bargain of mutual obligation), is mandatory for 
achieving a competiti ve international position. The OECD calls 
this a 'race to the bottom', when governments see globalisation 
demanding the reduction of social protection in order to maintain 
a competitive edge. I I The opposing view is that a strong wage 
regime, and investment in employment generation, education 
and training, as well as other social protection measures for 
those who are adversely affected, or benefit least from 
globalisation and the increased application of technology to 
industry, do not impede competitiveness. Such policies reduce 
destabilising and damaging inequalities, and generate a much 
better educated and skilled community and labour force. 
• The fracturing of the apparent bipartisan social consensus around 
respect, tolerance and policy acceptance of Australia's cultural, 
ethnic and linguistic diversity-more broadly, debates about 
the future of Australia's social cohesion. 
In this paper I will address only the first two matters, and return to 
the last significant issue in a later paper. 
The unifying theme for the three elements of the moral/ethical 
debate about creating an Australian public policy response to 
the increased trend to flexible labour/flexible welfare in the next 
millennium-the future of employment and its remuneration; 
the future of incomes policy; the future of social cohesion in 
multicultural Australia-is the marked contradiction between the 
economics of market dominance and the politics of social inclusion. 
All of these debates are premised on the basic assumption that 
there is a powerful, indeed essential, role for government, not 
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only as arbiter and legislatively empowered regulator (a role for 
governments made, paradoxically, even more essential as more 
elements of the economy and labour market are deregulated), but 
also as provider of increased social investment in a wide range of 
educational, physical and social infrastructure, i.e. in public 
goods which increase the overall well-being of Australians and 
promote the more equitable distribution of well-being. According 
to Fred Argy in his recent insightful book, Australia at the 
Crossroads, 'the increasing globalisation of capital markets has 
made governments less able or willing to take discretionary fiscal 
or even monetary counter-cyclical action' .12 Yet, Argy says, in 
the interests of social equity as well as effective economic policy, 
which generates both a net increase in social well-being and a 
better distribution of well-being, it is essential that national 
governments curtail what he calls 'the extraordinary influence 
exercised by globalised financial markets on economic, social and 
labour market policy' and exercise responsibility in promoting 
'greater international co-operation and intervention (both on 
economic and social issues) to maximise the ability of individual 
countries to pursue their own social and economic priorities' .13 In 
such a construction ofthe problem, the gaze turns from the alleged 
dependency of individuals, even, as it is said, generations of 
indi viduals, to the professed dependency of governments, asserting 
their powerlessness to act in the face of the global juggernaut. 
A very similar argument is made by the recent report on social 
policy published by the OECD,14 which argues that adequate, 
equitable and effectively delivered systems of social protection 
(tax/benefit policies; education, training and employment policies; 
and public health policies) are essential in providing social infra-
structure for successful national responses to internationalisation. 
Increased, rather than reduced, levels of social protection are seen 
by this OECD report as essential in redressing inequalities of 
opportunity and income, improving access to employment, and 
promoting social inclusion as a countervailing trajectory to 
international market pressures. Such insights appear not to have 
penetrated far in Australian public policy debates. Rather, the 
sense of social insecurity and welfare state fear, which the impact 
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of internationalisation has generated through the erosion of secure 
employment and of an adequate community service infrastructure, 
has become compounded by contemporary debates which further 
insist that welfare is itself the problem, rather than one element of 
a larger social protection assemblage. 
Transformations of Work in Australia: The Rise and Fall of 
Full Employment and the Increase in Inequality 
Let us consider the possible impact of placing once again the idea 
of 'full employment' on the policy agenda. This requires a careful 
redefinition of the elements of 'full employment' in a radically 
altered labour market and in a period when the expectations of 
women and men about education and employment through the 
working life span show a trend towards convergence, and when 
the better integration of the responsibilities of work and care have 
been given insufficient attention. 
Labour market changes in Australia include a decrease in the 
importance of manufacturing in the overall economic and industrial 
structure, especially in the older forms oflow productivity, labour-
intensive manufacturing, and in the ncreased share taken by the 
service industries in the generation of GDP, with concomitant 
changes in the national and international organisation of 
manufacturing as well as the service industries. In the OECD 
countries the share of all employment accounted for by the service 
sector rose from less than 50 per cent in 1970 to around 65 per 
cent in 1992, with most of the job growth in the 1980s occurring 
in services such as finance, insurance and business services, and 
community and personal services. 15 Further, manufacturing itself 
has been changing its mode of organisation with the 'contracting 
out' of non-core services, again with major implications for the 
type of jobs which are generated. 16 In some countries such changes 
have resulted in the emergence of a two-tiered labour market, 
comprising a core of secure, well paid workers and a growing 
periphery of insecure, casual, part-time workers, who are most at 
risk of recurrent bouts of unemployment.J7 
In some countries, including Australia, these trends have been 
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accompanied by an increased incidence of part-time and casual 
employment and irregular self-employment, characteristic of the 
organisation of the service industries, and by the reduction of full-
year, full-time employment in manufacturing and construction. 
This has been called, with justification, 'precarious employment'-
employment circumscribed by very limited duration contracts. 18 
The OECD notes that, in the period 1984-94, the proportion of 
temporary employees as a percentage of all employees increased 
in Australia, France, the Netherlands and Spain, in Australia 
from about 16 per cent in 1984 to almost 24 per cent in 1994. 19 
A comprehensive Australian analysis indicates that casual 
employment tends to be low skilled, to involve jobs for which 
little training is required or received, and to have limited career 
prospects.20 In addition, as Richard Sennett has compellingly 
argued,21 it is not only jobs in manufacturing and the lower 
reaches of the most casualised service industries which have been 
affected. The nature of jobs and the conditions of employment 
in professional, administrative, executive occupations have also 
been subjected to expectations of a pervasive in-house competitive-
ness to match the forms of external competition, and to a work 
intensification in which paid work time devours most other 
aspects of private time, family time, and sociability time. This is 
a context of over-work in which welfare state fears, indeed 
welfare state condemnation, thrive. The over-worked compare 
their lot with that of the under-worked and see themselves as dis-
privileged. The nails in the welfare state coffin have here their 
strongest hammer blows. 
Such labour market transformations in Australia and other 
OECD countries have been accompanied by changes in the 
distribution of wages, changes which differ according to public 
policies which have either mitigated or exacerbated the trend to 
greater wage inequality. From the early 1980s, growth in real 
wages moderated, and wage shares in national income fell back 
to, or even below, their 1970 levels. In the Anglophone countries, 
including Australia, there were falls in the real wages of low-paid 
workers, and the wage differentials between low and high-skilled 
workers widened with increased inequality in the dispersion of 
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wages. In the continental European countries, on the other hand, 
wage differentials were either broadly unchanged, or inequality 
increased only slightly.22 The 1994 OECD Jobs Study speaks of 
unemployment taking two forms: either overt unemployment or 
low-paid, low quality jobs. High rates of unemployment in Europe, 
Canada, Australia and other Anglophone countries are matched 
by an increase in the proportion of poor quality jobs in the United 
States, while in that country officially-recorded unemployment 
rates have fallen. 
There has been an additional direct impact of labour market 
transformations on income distribution, in this case on the source 
of income, as a greater proportion of the employment-age 
population has been compelled to rely on social security income 
support in periods oflabour force exclusion. This has occurred not 
only because of the traditional contingencies of severe illness and 
disability and infrequent periods of short-term unemployment, as 
had previously been the case in the post-war welfare state, but, in 
much greater numbers, because of exclusion from full-time, secure, 
labour force participation as a result of long-term unemployment, 
involuntary labour force withdrawal before the normal retirement 
age, and the joblessness associated with child care responsibilities 
for sole parents.23 
Comparative data analysed by Whiteford indicate that market 
wage inequality for men and women increased over the 1980s 
in most of the OECD countries studied (the USA, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, Japan, Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Australia).24 Compared with the USA, Canada and the United 
Kingdom, the increase in market wage inequality over the period 
1975-91 was less great in Australia, and the ratio of female to 
male wage rates was significantly closer to equal. The factors 
which tended to put a partial brake on the increase in market-
driven inequalities are attributed to Australia's centralised wage-
fixing institutions, which were still in place in the 1980s. Despite 
these countervailing trends, a mounting body of research 
indicates that since the early 1980s inequality in private 
incomes increased in Australia, whether income is measured 
pre- or post-tax.25 This is attributed to increased inequality in the 
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dispersion of market incomes, mitigated, but not sufficiently, by 
the redistributive impacts of social policies, including social 
security, public health and housing policies.26 The increase in 
inequality derived from market incomes is attributed to higher 
rates of unemployment, mainly affecting workers in low skilled 
jobs, and putting downward pressure on wages; and to techno-
logical changes in the workplace with the demand for a more 
highly educated and skilled workforce which has increased the 
earnings differential between highly skilled workers and those 
considered less skilled, whose employment has become more 
precarious.27 Peter Saunders, in a comprehensive, comparative 
review of income inequality, points to market-driven forces and 
the impact of globalisation of the world economy on labour 
markets within industrialised countries. 28 In the Australian context, 
John Nevile29 identifies deregulation, not only of the labour market 
but also of financial markets, as an important factor causing the 
increase in inequality. 
Using Peter Saunders's most recent analysis, it is apparent that 
the following changes in the distribution of income have taken 
place over the 1980s and 1990s: 
• a substantial increase in overall inequality as well as the degree 
of inequality within age, gender, educational and industry 
groupings; 
• a trend to inequality that has primarily been driven by increasing 
inequality in market incomes, offset to some degree by 
redistributive social policy measures; 
• a general tendency for most of the distributional change to take 
place at the top of the distribution, with the top 10 per cent 
increasing their share of income, while social security and 
family income support reforms through the transfer system 
protected, to some extent, the family incomes of those at the 
bottom of the income distribution. These two tendencies have 
resulted in the income share of those in the middle of the 
income distribution falling somewhat, not, however, to the 
advantage of the lowest income recipients, but to the advantage 
of the highest income recipients. 
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• a preliminary analysis of recent ABS figures indicates that, 
over the 1990s, the income share of the lowest 20 per cent of 
income recipients has fallen since the late 1980s, while that of 
the top 20 per cent has risen further.3o 
In examining this issue in relation to the distribution of work and 
the distribution of poverty, Saunders notes that 'work remains the 
main source of income for most people and it is mainly in the 
world of paid work (or the lack of it) that the profile of income 
inequality is determined' .31 How has this increase in income 
inequality affected the number and proportion of the population in 
poverty in the 1990s? Using the Henderson Poverty Line over the 
period 1975-76 to 1993-94, Saunders concludes that the poverty 
rate among working age families increased from 7.9 per cent to 
15.6 per cent, with the biggest rise being for single people and, in 
particular, sole parent families. The rise in poverty for couples 
with and without children was evident, but it was not nearly as 
great as for single people and sole parent families. In the mid-
1990s, poverty rates for people of working age stood at 20 per 
cent for single people, 30 per cent for sole parent families, 15 per 
cent for couples with children, and 6 per cent for couples without 
children. Almost half of all poverty among working age people 
is in families with only one potential adult income earner, high-
lighting the overwhelming importance of two factors in guarding 
against poverty: having at least one adult in the family in a full-
time job, and, further to that, having a second income as an even 
stronger bulwark against poverty. This is a critical issue in a 
climate where many elements of government policy appear to 
have the objective of creating disincentives for women with 
children to enter and remain in employment, through changes to 
the tax system and through great reduction in the affordability of 
child care, and where rapid labour market transformations are 
making access to full-time, reasonably secure employment 
more precarious for both men and women. While a family with 
two earners is a significant guarantee against poverty, this is the 
case only if one partner is working full-time. Protecting couples 
and sole parents with only part-time earnings from falling into 
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poverty would involve very substantial increases in family 
payments to low income families with no one in full-time 
employment. I will return to this policy issue below. 
In the United Kingdom and the USA and in some parts of 
Europe there has been an increase in the number of employed 
people defined as the 'working poor' -employees whose wages 
are not sufficient to provide them and their families with a decent 
basic income, according to standards accepted in their countries as 
adequate. This has occurred because high levels of unemployment 
over the 1980s exerted downward pressure on earnings in a climate 
of labour market deregulation, which was accompanied by 
reduction or removal of safeguards on low wages through dilution 
or removal of minimum wage regulations.32 In Australia, at least 
in the 1980s, a reasonable minimum floor for wages and basic 
employment conditions was protected for most employees, as an 
effect of award wages determined by the centralised wage fixation 
institution, the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, and 
by Commonwealth legislation which has since been superseded. 
Concerns have been expressed, however, that the acceleration of 
individualised contractual forms of wage bargaining and the 
greater casualisation of employment conditions through 
industrial relations legislation will exacerbate the inequality of 
market income distribution, halt or reverse the gains made in 
closing the gender gap in wage rates, and increase the prevalence 
of low-paid jobs. 33 
Flexible work/flexible welfare: the contested debates 
In liberal and social democracies, various forms of social protection 
affect the distribution of social advantages and disadvantages, 
both among persons and through each person's lifecourse. 34 
What have been construed as the purposes of social protection? 
I consider these three to be the most important: prevention and 
elimination of poverty; reduction of inequality; creation of social 
integration and solidarity. At the same time, it is also the business 
of social protection to construct investment policies, and 
employment and labour market policies whose concern is the 
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sustainable creation of high levels of employment and the reduction 
of unemployment. Markets themselves are politically constructed 
and therefore the product of many forms of regulation (or the 
relative absence of regulation), while the processes of social 
protection involve not only social security systems and revenue 
raising tax processes, but policies concerned with employment, 
unemployment, wage determination, housing, transport, health 
and education. Ultimately, social protection matters fundamentally 
because no society can be sustained on the basis that individuals 
are treated like commodities.35 
The first issue to be addressed is whether or not governments 
should invest explicitly in employment growth: whether public 
investment in employment, education and training programs should 
be sufficient to increase employment and reduce unemployment 
in a substantial and sustainable way, and to reinstate the principle 
of 'full employment' , rather than being no more than an intermittent 
and partial response to recession, rapidly reduced or withdrawn 
at the outset of economic recovery, or seen as a suitable object of 
expenditure cuts in an agenda of budgetary contraction.36 
The second issue concerns the future role of an incomes policy 
in providing an adequate basic income in a substantially changed, 
increasingly deregulated labour market. The traditional expectation 
of the distribution of paid and unpaid work (a previous model of 
full-year, full-time employment for male workers through a full 
'working life-time', accompanied by interrupted, casual and part-
time employment for women with children) no longer holds, 
and, paradoxically, the casual labour/intermittent employment! 
flexible labour models, previously the domain of women, are 
penetrating into what has been called mainstream employment. 
This is manifested as a debate about the advantages and dis-
advantages of reinforcing the 'targeting' and scrutinising of welfare 
(social security and community services) in a climate where fiscal 
imperatives and budget deficit reduction are given primacy in the 
policy debate, without reference to other inter-related public policy 
issues: the expansion of revenue by the reduction of unemployment 
and the broadening and strengthening of the tax base.37 
If a new basis for welfare state policies were to be constructed 
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in the twenty-first century, what form of employment policy would 
it require? Is there any evidence that a thoroughly contemporary 
concept of 'full employment' has entered policy debate, and 
that ways to achieve this goal have been pursued in public policy 
in the 1980s and 1990s? The very idea of full employment 
was abandoned, either intentionally or by default, from the 
mid-1970s and very briefly re-invoked in official policy in the 
1993 Commonwealth Government Green Paper Restoring Full 
Employment.38 This was the point at which a number of voices in 
community organisations and the universities attempted to mobilise 
support for full employment (redefined to meet contemporary 
social needs) to be re-instated as an overarching policy priority.39 
These commentators argued that such a priority would require 
established targets for sustained employment growth, targets for 
the progressive reduction of unemployment; and programs to 
ensure that long-term unemployed people and disadvantaged job 
seekers are able to benefit from education, training and employment 
growth, rather than remaining the victims of labour market 
restructuring, even when the rate of employment growth is strong.40 
Plans for increased investment in education, training and 
employment programs were projected in the 1995/96 budget, but 
subsequently cut substantially by the Coalition Government from 
1996. The emphasis lies currently on 'workfare' programs, and 
the 'work for the dole' scheme, which is much more concerned 
with the conditions attached to income support eligibility-the 
notion of mutual obligation-than with employment and training 
programs, or a dedicated pursuit of investment in jobs growth. 
Where now sits the national and international debate about policies 
to achieve full employment in the next century? 
Employment, Education and Training Policies 
Turning first to employment policies, the research, with varying 
emphases, identifies the elements of a sustained strategy: longer-
term employment growth based on wide-ranging investment in 
infrastructure and regional development;41 sustained investment 
in education and training programs, to ensure both the equitable 
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distribution of job opportunities in the context of economic growth 
and a more efficient labour market; setting in place continuing 
education and training for people in employment (life-long learning 
to educate broadly and flexibly for the transforming labour markets 
of globalised production and trade); along with policies which 
enable formerly unemployed and precariously-employed people 
to move into secure, high quality jobs, rather than being 'trapped' 
on the margins of a divided labour market.42 Such policies are 
based on the premise that labour market programs should not only 
have the short-term goal of support for job search, job placement, 
and improving the skill levels of unemployed, particularly long-
term unemployed, people, but should also support their movement 
from the periphery to the core of the labour market. 
What does international research indicate about the effectiveness 
of measures to reduce unemployment, long-term unemployment 
and labour force marginality? OEeD analyses indicate that, in the 
majority of countries, labour market programs improve access to 
the labour market and to jobs, develop job related skills, promote 
more efficient labour markets, and strengthen the links between 
growth of aggregate demand, job creation and the supply of 
qualified labour. Moreover, programs are particularly appropriate 
for improving the job prospects of long-term unemployed people 
and those with limited job qualifications. Such programs, to be of 
high quality and hence effective, cannot be designed and delivered 
as cheap and expendable, precariously-funded options. They are 
essential components of employment, education and training 
policies, for as long as structural unemployment persists. This 
requires not only substantial investment but, more importantly, 
the planned integration of shorter-term labour market programs 
into overall longer-term education and vocational training policies, 
so that unemployed people and vulnerable employees are re-
integrated into more secure employment. 
Wages Policy 
An alternative approach to policies for reducing unemployment 
rejects the evidence of the efficacy of labour market programs and 
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government intervention to stimulate employment growth and 
focusses on the wages system. The proposition is put that a 'trade-
off' can be made between unemployment and lower wages, that 
better employment outcomes can be achieved if the protection of 
wages and conditions for employees is reduced and the incidence 
of low-paid jobs increased. Greater labour market flexibility and 
the diminution of the authority of centralised institutions of 
wage regulation are seen by some commentators to be justified 
as a way to reduce the labour costs of less skilled workers and 
hence to make them more competitive in the job stakes.43 Other 
commentators describe this as a program of labour market 
deregulation whose objective is the winding back of systems of 
protective labour regulations on the supposition that greater labour 
market flexibility will enable the price mechanism of wages to 
balance supply and demand.44 Given the social costs of such a 
'trade-off', are there any gains to be made through the reduction 
of unemployment? The 1994 OECD Jobs Study notes that the 
USA has a much higher incidence of low pay than most other 
OECD countries. Over one-quarter of all full-time workers in the 
United States earn less than two-thirds of median earnings, 
compared with one-fifth of full-time workers in the European 
Community and one-tenth in Australia. In Australia the debate is 
focussed on the effects of more thorough deregulation of the 
labour market and the wages system through the extension of 
enterprise bargaining and the increased spread of individual 
employment contracts, as well as the dilution of both the award 
system and the role of trade unions in wage bargaining.45 Some 
community sector voices are advocating the retention of a floor of 
wage regulation through the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission and the awards system, and the provision of a strong 
'safety net' of a 'living wage' and protective standards for all 
employees, particularly the least industrially powerful in a context 
of enterprise bargaining.46 Such advocates also argue that the 
strengthening of employment leave arrangements, including annual 
leave and sick leave, leave for family purposes, maternity and 
parental leave, and the movement to shorter rather than longer 
working hours, are necessary to ensure good living standards and 
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overall well-being where the better integration of family and 
employment responsibilities are recognised. There are also 
important claims made for safeguarding the principle of 'equal 
remuneration for work of equal value' , which has had an equalising 
effect on the disparities in male/female wages since the mid-
1970s, and for safeguarding the right to collective representation 
through trade unions. But there is little indication that the key-
words of flexibility and deregulation in wages policy are anything 
other than in the ascendancy. 
The Future of Incomes Policy 
In the attempt to place the concept of 'full employment' into a 
contemporary context, it has been argued cogently that 'work' 
must be redefined to encompass a range of socially accepted and 
valued modes of participation, including caring work, which is 
essential to the well-being of dependent children and other 
vulnerable family members (e.g. those with a disability and the 
aged), and return to education and training, among other factors. 
The point is made that full employment cannot be achieved by 
demanding that all adults are engaged in market employment 
throughout the full period of their adult life; such total com-
modification of labour would diminish recognition of the many 
forms of social contribution which enrich family and community 
life. Consideration of this issue moves the focus to incomes policy 
through the tax/benefit system for people of employment age and 
their families.47 Fundamental questions are being asked about the 
role of the tax/benefit system not only in respect of people excluded 
from the labour market by unemployment, illness, disability, or 
the responsibility to care for dependent children or a severely ill or 
disabled partner or close relative, but also in respect of employed 
people whose earnings are too low to support them and their 
families adequately. 
The most recent OECD Report has identified two alternative 
strategies emerging in the OECD countries with regard to incomes 
and wages policy.48 Both require the interaction of wages policy 
and the tax/benefit system, or other forms of government support 
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policies. Both are concerned with reducing inequality associated 
with low-paid jobs. The first strategy involves allowing wage 
inequality to increase, as a spur to increased hiring by firms, while 
also putting in place employment-contingent benefits for low-
paid workers (with and without children) through cash transfers or 
tax credits to provide income supplementation. The second strategy 
uses a wage floor, e.g. through minimum wage legislation, and 
provides a wage subsidy to employers to encourage the hiring of 
employees who would otherwise remain unemployed. The fear 
is that neither strategy is adopted, i.e. wage inequality is allowed 
to increase without a fully thought through tax/transfer policy 
to supplement inadequate market incomes; or wage floors are 
maintained, without a fully thought through system of wage 
subsidies, to enable unemployed people to gain employment 
experience and associated training. This raises the question: does 
the tax/benefit system have a key role in providing an adequate 
basic income in an increasingly deregulated labour market?49 
There are at least three significantly different conceptions about 
the future role of the tax/benefit system under changing labour 
market circumstances. The first, which is current policy, focusses 
on more narrow 'targeting' of income support payments and closer 
surveillance of income support recipients and tighter eligibility 
conditions, as implemented in: the abolition of unemployment 
support for adolescents aged 16-17 years, and tighter, parent-
based income-testing for young adults through the 'common youth 
allowance'; the 'work for the dole' scheme; extension of the 
waiting period from three months to two years after arrival for 
many categories of migrants before they gain eligibility to claim 
income support; tighter scrutiny of income support for sole parents. 
The clear objective is to make income support considerably more 
conditional and to enforce more vigorously tougher compliance 
obligations. 
A second approach has been aired in Australia but not become 
explicit policy. This looks to reduction in the rate of income 
support payments in line with reduction in wages for employees in 
the lowest ranges of the wage distribution.50 This debate is framed 
in terms of incenti ves to unemployed people to take low-paid jobs, 
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without reference to the changed nature of the labour market, or to 
the research which identifies the already low replacement rates of 
income support payments, compared with average wage rates. An 
OECD study in 1998 indicates that the income replacement rates 
for people in Australia receiving income support, compared 
with the average wage received by those working full-time in the 
manufacturing sector, was 38 per cent for a single person, 74 per 
cent for a couple with two children, and 54 per cent for a sole 
parent with two children.51 Empirical investigation indicates that 
only very rarely (if ever) are income support recipients 'better off 
than they would be in paid work, and the main cause of increased 
dependency on income support is the 'absence of sufficient jobs' .52 
The OECD dismisses a strategy of reduction in benefit levels, 
stating that such a policy is very likely to have harsh social 
consequences, increasing exclusion and poverty and having no 
positive effect on employment. 
A third approach departs fundamentally from the principles 
inherent in the two above. The concept of 'citizens' income' or a 
'guaranteed minimum' is put forward in the United Kingdom and 
Europe by advocates who seek to revitalise the social rights of 
citizenship by making social security/social assistance systems 
more inclusive, particularly under changing labour market 
conditions. Proposals take various forms according to their 
advocates, but are reasonably characterised as a tax credit/transfer 
payment or minimum income guarantee, made to all citizens, not 
on the basis of current or previous income or workforce, but based 
only on the criterion of citizenship.53 The as yet muted debate 
in Australia focusses on the much more realisable and feasible 
objective of replacing the increasingly complex set of differentiated 
income support payments for people of working age, which 
historically has depended on meeting the eligibility criteria of 
various' categories' , with a generic income support payment, which 
could be in the form of a benefit ora tax credit.54 In addition, in a 
changed labour market and wages policy environment, questions 
have been raised as to whether such payments should be utilised 
only as replacement income for people excluded from paid 
employment by various contingencies, or also used as a guaranteed 
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income for employed people whose income falls below an agreed 
minimum. This approach is based on research which demonstrates 
that the increased market income inequality and poverty generated 
by high levels of unemployment and deregulatory policies in 
Australia in the 1980s-early 1990s was mitigated to some extent 
by redistributive social security policies.55 A recent OECD report 
on social assistance programs concludes that they played a major 
role in easing economic transitions in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, during the deepest recession since World War 11.56 
The nub of my argument is that any conception of 'full 
employment' in contemporary labour market and social conditions 
must focus not only on much increased investment in education, 
training and employment growth, but also on social policies 
concerned to combat social exclusion and to mitigate inequality. 
If all human endeavour and community/family participation 
throughout adult life is to revolve, of necessity, around labour 
force participation, then all modes of social participation would 
be marketised. Where then are the 'social spaces' in which other 
modes of legitimately recognised social participation and 
contribution can be supported and facilitated? If such spaces are to 
be identified and embedded in a policy of full employment, attention 
might turn to the following forms of social and economic 
participation: participation in paid work, both full- and part-time; 
being unemployed and looking for work; participation in education 
or training through the life span; involvement in unpaid, non-
market caring work in family, household, extended kin network; 
and participation in a range of community projects. The over-
riding objective is to ensure that combinations of market income 
and tax/benefit support provide adequate social protection and the 
basis for participatory citizenship. It is the principle of adequacy 
which demands urgent attention, adequacy of income derived 
from combinations of market earnings and tax/benefit payments 
in a much more integrated way than is now the case. It is also 
of great importance to provide an adequate tax/benefit floor for 
low-paid workers in an increasingly deregulated and casualising 
labour market. 
The 1994 OECD Jobs Study raises the option of more integrated 
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tax and benefit systems of the negative income tax or tax credit 
type, and goes on to rule them out on the basis of likely cost and 
of inadequate attention which may be paid to reducing poverty. 
The arguments nevertheless provide a strong rationale for taxi 
benefit reforms which depend upon closer integration between 
these two systems. The objective is to ensure that people and 
families in employment receive higher post-tax/post-benefit 
income than do people totally reliant on income support, an 
objective which requires that low-paid employees, particularly 
those with children, receive additional income support whilst in 
paid work, and that more liberal income tests apply in respect of 
unemployed people whose only option is part-time employment 
(an increasingly common experience). These sensible suggestions 
reflect not only a desire to reduce the high effective marginal tax 
rates which apply to work force transition in many OECD 
countries for people who have been on income support, but also 
signal a strong rejection of the very idea of 'dependency'. Are 
low-paid employed people with children and part-time employees 
whose inadequate market incomes are augmented by social 
transfers, 'dependent'? Clearly, this would be a very misleading, 
indeed mischievous, way to connote the combinations of market 
wage and social wage increasingly likely to be received in a 
flexible labour market. A subsequent OECD Report on Social 
Assistance in Australia, Finland, Sweden and the United KingdomS7 
argues in this vein-that tax/benefits systems are increasingly 
expected to provide a minimum income guarantee in increasingly 
deregulated economies. 
Conclusions 
The choices facing Australian public policy are poised between a 
new model based on distributive justice, developed from Australian 
conditions, and what Argy calls a 'radical free market' model, 
characterised by labour market and wage deregulation without the 
necessary tax/benefit and other social protection policies to reduce 
inequality and social exclusion. There is little doubt that the 
reduction of inequality and the fostering of social cohesion must 
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rest on policies which adopt a 'social investment', rather than a 
'social expenditure' approach to economic as well as social policy, 
and that necessarily requires a long-term view of social as well 
as economic costs and benefits. Only when social exclusion as a 
result of unemployment, joblessness, inadequate income support 
or low pay is considered by governments and the broader public as 
anathema and inimical to living in a cohesive society will policies 
promoting the better distribution of well-being become central to 
Australia's political, economic and social institutions. This will 
require attention to tax policy which is predicated on raising 
sufficient revenue to invest in social infrastructure: increased in-
vestment injobs growth on a regional basis, education and training, 
and child care. And this needs to be done in an unhelpful environment 
where tax policy debates are much more concerned with reducing 
personal income tax and company tax and changing the tax mix, 
rather than placing tax into an arena where fundamental questions 
are asked about the purposes of equitably-raised tax revenue for 
public investment in a productive and cohesive civil society. 
In the contested debates which are being waged in Australia 
about the economics of market dominance and the politics of 
social inclusion, redefining and restoring full employment is the 
imperative. This will require: significant and sustained public 
investment in employment growth, education, training and labour 
market programs; reform of taxi benefit systems to ensure a seamless 
web of income support designed for contemporary conditions; a 
tax/benefit system which is both equitable and effective in 
supporting the many forms of participation in restructuring labour 
markets, in education and training, and in the work of informal 
care; wages and incomes policies which reverse the trend to 
increased income inequality. Under such policy conditions, 
globalisation and internationalisation would make their impact on 
Australia's economy, society and political culture through the 
regulatory controls of home-grown government policies, designed 
to increase overall well-being and distribute the benefits of growth 
in our productive capacities much more equitably. It is not only 
into social policies that the principle of equity must be embedded, 
but into economic policies as well. Only then will fear of the 
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welfare state be quelled, when a contemporary form of full 
employment is re-invented. 
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